Biosecurity Externalities and Indemnities for Infectious Animal Diseases
通过三个案例说明动物养殖中生物安全决策的外部性差异，并探讨这些差异对政策设计的意义，尤其关注养殖集中度对疾病控制激励的影响。
In animal agriculture, biosecurity decisions are dispersed across many herd owners. Choices affecting disease spread are determined by impacts on private economic values, as well as economic externalities. But not all externalities are alike. By way of three very distinct examples, we demonstrate how they differ, and what these differences mean for policies seeking to manage them. The examples examined include an endemic disease pool that can be managed by limiting sources and flows, an exotic disease that can be managed by way of coordinated communication, and an infrastructural support externality that can be managed by disease outbreak insurance. We pay particular attention to how concentration in animal herd ownership affects incentives for disease control.