Managerial ability and bank‐loan pricing
研究了借款企业管理层能力对银行贷款定价的影响，发现能力越强贷款价格越低，主要通过改善经营业绩和信息披露两个渠道起作用。
Abstract This paper examines the impact of borrowers’ managerial ability on lenders’ bank‐loan pricing and the channels through which managerial ability affects bank‐loan pricing. Using a large sample of US bank loans, we provide evidence that higher managerial ability is associated with lower bank‐loan prices. This effect is stronger in firms with high information risk, suggesting that an important channel for managerial ability to affect bank‐loan pricing is through improved financial disclosure to mitigate information asymmetry. The relationship is also stronger for firms with weak business fundamentals, implying that another channel is through improved business performance. Of these two mechanisms, path analysis suggests that the business‐fundamentals mechanism is the more important channel through which managerial ability affects bank‐loan pricing.