Microprudential Regulation in a Dynamic Model of Banking
构建银行动态模型，研究微观审慎监管对银行贷款、效率和福利的影响，发现资本要求与贷款及福利呈倒U型关系，流动性要求降低贷款和福利，而基于资本状况的处置政策更优。
This paper studies the quantitative impact of microprudential bank regulations on bank lending and value metrics of efficiency and welfare in a dynamic model of banks that are financed by debt and equity, undertake maturity transformation, are exposed to credit and liquidity risks, and face financing frictions. We show that (1) there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between bank lending, welfare, and capital requirements, (2) liquidity requirements unambiguously reduce lending, efficiency, and welfare, and (3) resolution policies contingent on observed capital, such as prompt corrective action, dominate in efficiency and welfare terms (noncontingent) capital and liquidity requirements.