The Interaction of Public and Private Insurance: Medicaid and the Long-Term Care Insurance Market
发现即使是不完全的公共保险也会挤出私人保险需求，估计医疗补助可解释约三分之二财富分布人群缺乏私人长期护理保险的原因，但其对多数人提供的消费平滑不完全，且挤出效应源于医疗补助对私人保险征收的高隐性税（中位财富个体约60-75%）。
We show that even incomplete public insurance can crowd out private insurance demand. We estimate that Medicaid could explain the lack of private long-term care insurance for about two-thirds of the wealth distribution, even if no other factors limited the market's size. Yet Medicaid provides incomplete consumption smoothing for most individuals. Medicaid's crowd-out effect stems from the large implicit tax (about 60–75 percent for a median-wealth individual) that Medicaid imposes on private insurance. An implication is that public policies designed to stimulate the private insurance market will have limited efficacy as long as Medicaid's large implicit tax remains.