Imperfect Competition, Debt, and Exit
证明，寡头市场中一家亏损企业可能通过承诺继续生产来促成有利的并购，高债务融资使这一决策对股东最优，并分析了该决策可重新谈判的条件，对破产保护企业同样适用。
We show that an unprofitable firm in an oligopoly product market may motivate afavorable merger by committing to continue production, thereby dissipating industry profits. A sufficiently high level ofdebtfinancing makes the firm's production decision optimalfor its equityholders. We show conditions for this production decision to be renegotiation-proof Our analysis also applies to firms that are under bankruptcy protection, which enables them to finance continued operations with new debt. The empirical implications of our analysis relate takeovers of distressed firms to the nature of product market competition, the firms' debt policy, and the regulatory environment.