The Value of Voting Rights to Majority Shareholders: Evidence from Dual-Class Stock Unifications
研究67家双重股权结构公司统一为一股一票时，大股东放弃超级投票权所获补偿，发现1%投票权的中位价格约为公司股权的0.1%，且投票权价格随机构持股比例下降、随大股东失去的投票权比例上升。
We study transactions of voting rights. In our sample of 67 dual class unifications superior vote shareholders give up their superior voting status (all firm stocks become "one share one vote"), and receive (in most cases) compensation in the form of additional stocks. Based on the compensation granted, the median price of 1% of the vote is about 0.1% of firm's equity. More interestingly, the price of vote decreases with institutional holdings, and increases with the percentage vote lost by the majority shareholders. The position and interests of the majority holders appear as the main determinants of the price of vote. * School of Management, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel, and Chief Economist, Israel Securities Authority, Jerusalem 95464, Israel. ** Corresponding Author: The Anderson School at UCLA, 110 Westwood Plaza, Los Angeles CA 90095, USA; and School of Business Administration, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan 52900, Israel. Fax: 310-2065455; e-mail: ...