The Iceberg Theory of Campaign Contributions: Political Threats and Interest Group Behavior
提出一个模型，解释特殊利益集团如何通过捐款和威胁捐款来影响候选人，并利用1984-1990年美国众议院选举数据验证了预测。
We present a model where special interest groups condition contributions on the receiving candidate's support and also her opponent's. This allows interest groups to obtain support from contributions as well as from threats of contributing. Out-of-equilibrium contributions help explain the missing money puzzle. Our framework contradicts standard models in predicting that interest groups give to only one side of a race. We also predict that special interest groups will mainly target lopsided winners, whereas general interest groups will contribute mainly to candidates in close races. We verify these predictions in FEC data for US House elections from 1984–1990.