Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection
研究了如何设计干预措施来稳定受逆向选择困扰的金融市场，分析了参与决策所揭示的信息，发现干预效率可通过市场利率变化评估，外部市场影响最优干预形式但不影响实施成本。
We study the design of interventions to stabilize financial markets plagued by adverse selection. Our contribution is to analyze the information revealed by participation decisions. Taking part in a government program carries a stigma, and outside options are mechanism dependent. We show that the efficiency of an intervention can be assessed by its impact on the market interest rate. The presence of an outside market determines the nature of optimal interventions and the choice of financial instruments (debt guarantees in our model), but it does not affect implementation costs.