Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments
研究可重新谈判的排他性合同（限制买方只从一家卖方购买）对关系专用性投资的影响，发现当投资完全特定于关系时排他性无效，但投资有外部效应时则会影响投资和总福利。
We consider the effect of a renegotiable exclusive contract restricting a buyer to purchase from only one seller on the levels of noncontractible investments undertaken in their relationship. Contrary to some informal claims in the literature, we find that exclusivity has no effect when all investments are fully specific to the relationship (i.e., are purely ‘‘internal’’). Exclusivity does matter when investments affect the value of the buyer’s trade with other sellers (i.e., have ‘‘external’’ effects). We examine the effects of exclusivity on investments and aggregate welfare, and the private incentives of the buyer-seller coalition to use it.