Pay for Percentile
提出一种将教师薪酬与学生成绩在比较组中的排名挂钩的激励方案，该方案能引导教师付出社会最优的努力，并避免教师为特定考试形式教学或操纵评分标准。
We propose an incentive scheme for educators that links compensation to the ranks of their students within comparison sets. Under certain conditions, this scheme induces teachers to allocate socially optimal levels of effort. Moreover, because this scheme employs only ordinal information, it allows education authorities to employ completely new assessments at each testing date without ever having to equate various assessments. This removes incentives for teachers to teach to a particular assessment form and eliminates opportunities to influence reward pay by corrupting assessment scales. Education authorities can employ separate no-stakes assessment systems to track trends in scaled measures of student achievement.