Too Much Pay-Performance Sensitivity?
研究了1992至2004年间美国公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性和凸性（Vega）与未来股票风险和回报的关系，发现两者均与较低的未来回报相关，部分原因在于风险厌恶的高管会降低股权风险，但即使调整风险后，期权敏感度仍与低回报相关，暗示期权激励可能加剧代理问题。
We examine the relation between pay-performance sensitivity (PPS), the convexity of managerial compensation (Vega), and future stock risk and returns for a large sample of firms between 1992 and 2004. Higher PPS and Vega are both associated with lower future stock returns. Part of this negative relation can be explained by risk-averse managers decreasing equity risk in response to increases in PPS and Vega. However, even after correcting for lower future risk, future stock returns are negatively associated with the magnitude of option sensitivity. This finding is consistent with previous studies that link high option compensation to manager-owner agency problems. © 2011 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.