Can Strong Corporate Governance Selectively Mitigate the Negative Influence of “Special Interest” Shareholder Activists? Evidence from the Labor Market for Directors
研究利用股东提案数据，发现董事劳动力市场作为治理机制，能有选择地减轻工会基金等利益冲突股东对公司的负面影响，而不抑制低成本积极主义者的所有影响。
Union and public pension funds, the most prolific institutional activists employing low-cost targeting methods, are often accused of pursuing private benefits. Extant literature finds that unions representing workers, as stakeholders, are not aligned with shareholders. Limiting shareholder power may mitigate “special interest” activism but can also exacerbate managerial agency problems. In two different settings, majority approved and withdrawn shareholder proposals, we examine and find supportive evidence that the director labor market as a corporate governance mechanism can selectively mitigate the negative influence that conflicted stakeholder-shareholder union funds have over firms without stifling all influence of low-cost activists.