Dynamic consistency, valuable information and subjective beliefs
研究了模糊性敏感偏好下，后果主义与动态一致性这两个性质的关系，发现它们并非不相容，而是通过信息价值和经济意义相连。对研究决策理论、博弈论和动态规划的经济学者有参考价值。
Abstract Ambiguity sensitive preferences must fail either Consequentialism or Dynamic Consistency (DC), two properties that are compatible with subjective expected utility and Bayesian updating, while forming the basis of backward induction and dynamic programming. We examine the connection between these properties in a general environment of convex preferences over monetary acts and find that, far from being incompatible, they are connected in an economically meaningful way. In single-agent decision problems, positive value of information characterises one direction of DC. We propose a weakening of DC and show that one direction is equivalent to weakly valuable information, whereas the other characterises the Bayesian updating of the subjective beliefs which are revealed by trading behavior.