Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street‐Level Bureaucracies*
研究了街头官僚机构中，不同利他程度的代理人如何根据薪酬政策（固定工资或绩效工资）自我选择进入或退出该职业，以及这对制裁客户行为的影响。
Abstract Many street‐level bureaucrats have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of a street‐level bureaucracy, and we study the implications of its personnel policy on the self‐selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ in altruism towards clients. When bureaucrats are paid flat wages, they do not sanction, and the most altruistic types sort into bureaucracy. Pay‐for‐performance induces some bureaucrats to sanction, but it necessitates an increase in compensation, which can result in sorting from the top and bottom of the altruism distribution. We also explain why street‐level bureaucrats often experience an overload of clients.