The Debt‐Contracting Value of Accounting Information and Loan Syndicate Structure
研究借款企业会计信息的债务契约价值如何影响银团贷款的所有权结构和契约结构，发现高债务契约价值能降低信息不对称，使牵头行保留更少贷款份额，并影响绩效定价条款中会计指标的使用。
ABSTRACT We investigate how both the ownership structure and explicit contractual structure of syndicated loan deals are shaped by the debt‐contracting value (DCV) of borrowers' accounting information. DCV captures the inherent ability of firms' accounting numbers to capture credit quality deterioration in a timely fashion. We hypothesize and document that when a borrower's accounting information possesses higher DCV, information asymmetry between the lead arranger and other syndicate participants is lower, allowing lead arrangers to hold a smaller proportion of new loan deals. Further, we document that the influence of DCV on the proportion of the loan retained is conditional on the lead arranger's reputation, the existence of a credit rating, and the lead arranger's previous relationships with the same borrower. Finally, we find that when loans include performance pricing provisions, the likelihood that the single performance measure used is an accounting ratio, rather than a credit rating, is increasing in DCV.