Lending to Innovative Firms
研究发现，专利保护增强或债权人权利提升使贷款更便宜；财务契约违规后研发投入下降，但集中在低效研发企业，创新产出未受损，表明银行贷款可有效支持创新企业。
Is bank financing compatible with innovation? We show that an exogenous enhancement in the value of borrowers’ patents, either through greater patent protection or creditor rights over collateral, results in cheaper loans. Using regression discontinuity design, we show that although R&D investment sharply drops following a financial covenant violation, the reduction is concentrated in firms with less productive R&D. Consequently, R&D reduction does not impair innovative output. Our results suggest that the property rights that patents confer to intellectual property and to lenders’ judicious exercise of control rights allow bank loans to be a viable means of financing for innovative firms.