Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis
利用东亚金融危机期间800家企业的数据，发现控制权与现金流权分离程度高的企业，其危机期间股票回报比其他企业低10-20个百分点，表明所有权结构影响内部人侵占小股东利益的行为。
ABSTRACT We use a sample of 800 firms in eight East Asian countries to study the effect of ownership structure on value during the region's financial crisis. The crisis negatively impacted firms' investment opportunities, raising the incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority investors. Crisis period stock returns of firms in which managers have high levels of control rights, but have separated their control and cash flow ownership, are 10–20 percentage points lower than those of other firms. The evidence is consistent with the view that ownership structure plays an important role in determining whether insiders expropriate minority shareholders.