Trade Credit: Suppliers as Debt Collectors and Insurance Providers
研究在合同执行有限的环境下，供应商因能中断中间品供应而在向客户放贷时比银行有比较优势，同时作为流动性提供者，为关系存续提供保险，并用英国企业面板数据验证了高隐含利率源于保险和违约溢价。
This article examines how in a context of limited enforceability of contracts suppliers may have a comparative advantage over banks in lending to customers because they are able to stop the supply of intermediate goods. Suppliers may act also as liquidity providers, insuring against liquidity shocks that could endanger the survival of their customer relationships. The relatively high implicit interest rates of trade credit are the result of insurance and default premiums that are amplified whenever suppliers face a relatively high cost of funds. I explore these effects empirically for a panel of UK firms.