Cross‐licensing and competition
分析了多家竞争企业之间双边交叉许可协议的竞争效应，发现无约束的交叉许可合同可维持垄断结果，并探讨了不使用许可技术时不支付许可费的场景及反垄断政策含义。
Abstract We analyze the competitive effects of bilateral cross‐licensing agreements in a setting with many competing firms. We show that firms can sustain the monopoly outcome if they can sign unconstrained bilateral cross‐licensing contracts. This result is robust to increasing the number of firms who can enter into a cross‐licensing agreement. We also investigate the scenario in which a cross‐licensing contract cannot involve the payment of a royalty by a licensee who decides ex post not to use the licensed technology. Finally, policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of cross‐licensing agreements are derived.