Crises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks
研究了不完全信息协调博弈中触发均衡转变的信息事件，发现当基本面变化分布具有厚尾特征时，多数人行为的转变可能由基本面达到临界阈值或大冲击引发，即使阈值尚未达到。
We study the informational events that trigger equilibrium shifts in coordination games with incomplete information. Assuming that the distribution of the changes in fundamentals has fat tails, we show that majority play shifts either if fundamentals reach a critical threshold or if there are large common shocks, even before the threshold is reached. The fat-tail assumption matters because it implies that large shocks make players more unsure about whether their payoffs are higher than others. This feature is crucial for large shocks to matter.