COLLUSION AND RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES*
研究了生产相似产品的企业间研发合作是否会导致产品市场合谋，发现合作研发通过维持企业对称性促进合谋，但可能提高社会福利。
I examine the question whether cooperation in R&D among firms producing similar products leads to product market collusion. Suppose that firms engage in a stochastic R&D race while maintaining the collusive equilibrium in a repeated‐game framework. Innovation under non‐cooperative R&D leads to an inter‐firm asymmetry, destabilizing collusion in pre‐discovery and post‐discovery periods. Innovation sharing under cooperative R&D preserves the symmetry and also increases total profit, thereby facilitating collusion. However, welfare may increase with cooperative R&D. I also examine the condition for collusion under licensing and compare the results.