The Compromise Game: Two-Sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory
分析了一个双方都有私人信息的博弈，玩家知道自己的“实力”并选择战斗或妥协。实验发现玩家经常妥协，且妥协收益越低战斗越多，先手比后手更少战斗。
We analyze a game of two-sided private information where players have privately known “strengths” and can decide to fight or compromise. If either chooses to fight, the stronger player receives a high payoff and the weaker player receives a low payoff. If both choose to compromise, each player receives an intermediate payoff. The only equilibrium is for players to always fight. In our experiment, we observe frequent compromise, more fighting the lower the compromise payoff and less fighting by first than second movers. We explore several theories of cognitive limitations in an attempt to understand these anomalous findings.