Expectations and the Stability Problem for Optimal Monetary Policies
发现，当私人主体使用适应性学习规则时，基于基本面的最优货币政策规则会变得不稳定；若将私人预期纳入政策规则，则可解决此问题，且结论在政策制定者与私人主体同时学习时仍成立。
A fundamentals based monetary policy rule, which would be the optimal monetary policy without commitment when private agents have perfectly rational expectations, is unstable if in fact these agents follow standard adaptive learning rules. This problem can be overcome if private expectations are observed and suitably incorporated into the policy maker's optimal rule. These strong results extend to the case in which there is simultaneous learning by the policy maker and the private agents. Our findings show the importance of conditioning policy appropriately, not just on fundamentals, but also directly on observed household and firm expectations. Copyright 2003, Wiley-Blackwell.