The Effect of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strikes and Wages
利用加拿大1967-1993年大型私营部门合同谈判数据，发现劳动政策显著影响罢工和工资：调解政策效果有限，合同重开条款降低谈判成本，而禁止使用替代工人的立法增加谈判成本并导致准租金从雇主向工会再分配。
Using Canadian data on large, private-sector contract negotiations from January, 1967, to March, 1993, we find that strikes and wages are substantially influenced by labor policy. The data indicate that conciliation policies have largely been ineffective in reducing strike costs. In contrast, general contract reopener provisions appear to make both unions and employers better off by reducing negotiation costs without systematically affecting wage settlements. Legislation banning the use of replacement workers appears to lead to significantly higher negotiation costs and redistribution of quasi-rents from employers to unions. © 1999 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology