Pipeline Risk in Leveraged Loan Syndication
研究了杠杆贷款安排人如何通过低价热销和配给冷销来应对投资者假装冷淡以获取更好条款的问题，并发现安排人保留更大贷款份额是为了配给冷销投资者，而非传统监控激励。
Abstract What is the economic role played by arrangers of leveraged loans, and what are the risks they face? We provide evidence that arrangers solve a demand discovery problem. Investors have incentives to feign little interest in the loan to obtain better terms. To deter such behavior, arrangers underprice hot deals and ration investors on cold deals. The risk associated with demand discovery is often shared between borrowers and arrangers. One implication is that to ration investors on cold deals, arrangers retain larger loan shares. This motive for retention is different from the monitoring incentive motive previously considered in the literature.