Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions
研究了两组非对称竞拍者在可分物品统一价格拍卖中的均衡行为，发现策略互补性因价格推断效应而增强，并揭示了支付与信息不对称如何导致无谓损失，且市场整合可能降低福利。
We analyze a divisible good uniform‐price auction that features two groups, each with a finite number of identical bidders, who compete in demand schedules. In the linear‐quadratic‐normal framework, this paper presents conditions under which the unique equilibrium in linear demands exists and derives novel comparative statics results that highlight the interaction between payoff and information parameters with asymmetric groups. We find that the strategic complementarity in the slopes of traders' demands is reinforced by inference effects from prices, and we display the role of payoff and information asymmetries in explaining deadweight losses. Furthermore, price impact and the deadweight loss need not move together, and market integration may reduce welfare. The results are consistent with the available empirical evidence.