Internal Labor Markets, Wage Convergence, and Investment
利用工厂级数据，研究发现多元化企业中低工资行业的工人获得高于行业平均的工资，且这种工资趋同效应通过NAFTA和最低工资变化得到验证，高工资工厂的资本密集度更高，表明内部劳动力市场可能影响内部资本市场的投资决策。
Abstract I document wage convergence in conglomerates using detailed plant-level data: Workers in low-wage industries collect higher-than-industry wages when the diversified firm also operates in high-wage industries. I confirm this effect by exploiting the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and changes in minimum wages at the state level as sources of exogenous increases in wages in some plants. I then track the evolution of wages of the remaining workers of the firm, relative to workers of unaffiliated plants. Plants where workers collect higher-than-industry wages operate with higher capital intensity, suggesting that internal labor markets may affect investment decisions in internal capital markets.