Education and the Allocation of Talent
研究教育如何通过信息资本和绩效合同影响人才在不同经济部门的配置，预测中等能力者接受教育而高能力者跳过教育，并比较英美及欧洲混合教育体系。
I study how education affects the allocation of talent into different sectors of the economy. I focus on two forces. First, education adds to a worker's information capital and, thus, may change her self-confidence. Second, performance contracts give a worker incentives to choose a sector according to her abilities. The baseline model predicts that workers with intermediate ability educate, while the most able skip education. In an extension, I compare the U.K. and the U.S. bachelor's degrees and, moreover, discuss hybrid educational systems, common in Europe, that offer both U.K. and U.S. types of bachelor's degrees.