Stochastic games with hidden states
研究了无限期随机博弈中玩家仅能观察行动和关于隐藏状态的噪声公开信息的情形，找到了可行且个体理性支付集对初始先验不变的充分条件，并证明了民间定理。
This paper studies infinite‐horizon stochastic games in which players observe actions and noisy public information about a hidden state each period. We find a general condition under which the feasible and individually rational payoff set is invariant to the initial prior about the state when players are patient. This result ensures that players can punish or reward their opponents via continuation payoffs in a flexible way. Then we prove the folk theorem, assuming that public randomization is available. The proof is constructive and uses the idea of random blocks to design an effective punishment mechanism.