Do Labor Issues Matter in the Determination of U.S. Trade Policy? An Empirical Reevaluation
在保护待售模型中引入集体谈判、行业间劳动力流动差异和工会游说，发现劳动力市场因素确实影响美国贸易保护水平，并用美国制造业数据验证了模型预测。
Some recent empirical studies, motivated by Grossman and Helpman's (1994) “protection-for-sale” model, suggest that very few factors (none of them labor related) determine trade protection. This paper reexamines the roles that labor issues play in the determination of trade policy. We introduce collective bargaining, differences in inter industry labor mobility, and trade union lobbying into the protection-for-sale model, and show that the equilibrium protection rate in our model depends upon these labor market variables. We test our model predictions using data from U.S. manufacturing and find that labor market considerations do seem to matter for U.S. trade policy.