Firm Wage Premia, Industrial Relations, and Rent Sharing in Germany
本文用三种方法研究德国产业关系对企业工资溢价的影响，发现集体协议和工会委员会会提高平均溢价，但集体协议降低溢价分散度，工会委员会则增加分散度，且集体谈判覆盖率下降是溢价分散度随时间上升的主因。
The authors use three distinct methods to investigate the influence of industrial relations on firm wage premia in Germany. First, ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for the firm effects from a two-way fixed-effects decomposition of workers’ wages reveal that average premia are larger in firms bound by collective agreements and in firms with a works council, holding constant firm performance. Next, recentered influence function (RIF) regressions show that premia are less dispersed among covered firms but more dispersed among firms with a works council. Finally, in an Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition, the authors find that decreasing bargaining coverage is the only factor they consider that contributes to the marked rise in premia dispersion over time.