Analyst Promotions within Credit Rating Agencies: Accuracy or Bias?
利用穆迪分析师内部劳动力市场的手工数据，研究发现评级准确的分析师更易晋升，而频繁降级或给出低于模型预测评级的分析师则相反，表明穆迪在准确性与客户偏好间权衡。
We estimate Moody’s preference for accurate versus biased ratings using hand-collected data on the internal labor market outcomes of its analysts. We find that accurate analysts are more likely to be promoted and less likely to depart. The opposite is true for analysts who downgrade more frequently, who assign ratings below those predicted by a ratings model, and whose downgrades are associated with large negative market reactions. Downgraded firms are also more likely to be assigned a new analyst. These patterns are consistent with Moody’s balancing its desire for accuracy against its corporate clients’ desire for higher ratings.