Incentives in Internal Capital Markets: Capital Constraints, Competition, and Investment Opportunities
研究公司内部各部门争夺有限财务资源时，对经理人创造盈利投资机会的激励有何影响。内部资本市场只有在各部门资源与投资潜力相同时才明确有益，否则可能降低激励甚至损害公司价值。文章分析了内部资本市场何时更可能增加价值，并讨论了对企业边界、多元化折价或溢价以及部门经理激励薪酬的启示。
We examine the effect of competition for scarce corporate financial resources on managers' incentives to generate profitable investment opportunities. Operating an active internal capital market is unambiguously beneficial only if divisions have the same level of financial resources and the same investment potential. Otherwise, managers' incentives may be lower and an internal capital market may decrease firm value even though headquarters allocates capital efficiently. We analyze under which conditions the operation of an internal capital market is more likely to add value, and we derive implications for the boundaries of firms, for a potential conglomerate discount or premium, and for the role of incentive pay for division managers.