Corporate Fraud, Governance, and Auditing
研究了经理人因帝国建设私利而可能欺诈甚至贿赂审计师时，股东如何通过联合选择审计质量与高管薪酬来设计公司治理，并分析了国家层面规则对公司层面治理选择的影响。
We analyze corporate fraud in a setting in which managers have superior information but are biased against liquidation because of their private benefits from empire building. This may induce them to misreport information and even bribe auditors when liquidation would be value-increasing. To curb fraud, shareholders optimally design corporate governance by jointly choosing audit quality and managerial compensation. We analyze how country-level rules affect these firm-level choices. Our analysis underscores that different country-level governance provisions have different effects on firm-level governance: Some act as substitutes of internal governance mechanisms, whereas others enhance their effectiveness and therefore complement them.