Ownership, incentives, and the hold‐up problem
指出纵向一体化能缓解敲竹杠问题，因为一体化企业通过低能激励促使部门经理合作谈判，提高投资和整体利润，即使没有利润分享也有效。
Vertical integration is often proposed as a way to resolve hold‐up problems. This ignores the empirical fact that division managers tend to maximize divisional (not firmwide) profit when investing. I develop a model with asymmetric information at the bargaining stage and investment returns taking the form of cash and “empire benefits.” Owners of a vertically integrated firm will then provide division managers with low‐powered incentives to induce them to bargain more cooperatively, resulting in higher investments and overall profit as compared with nonintegration. Vertical integration therefore mitigates hold‐up problems even without profit sharing .