Centralized and Decentralized Decision Making in Organizations
发现集中决策的一种新成本：当工人面临流动性约束时，让工人按自己的想法工作比强制执行经理的想法更容易激励，因此即使经理信息更优，分散决策也可能更优。
This article identifies a new type of cost associated with centralization. If workers are liquidity constrained, it may be less costly to motivate a worker who is allowed to work on his own idea than a worker who is forced to follow the manager's idea. Thus, it may be optimal to let workers decide on the method for doing their job even if managers have better information. This conclusion holds even if more general contracts are considered that are based on communication of information between the worker and the manager, as long as these general contracts are not entirely costless.