Reserve Requirements on Sovereign Debt in the Presence of Moral Hazard – on Debtors or Creditors?
分析了贷款方道德风险和借款方主权风险下，储备要求对金融贷款的影响，发现储备要求能降低违约风险并提高高收入与新兴市场国家的福利。
This paper characterises the effects of reserve requirements on financial loans in the presence of moral hazard on the lender side and sovereign risk on the borrower side. The impacts of such reserve requirements on the equilibrium default risk and borrowing are analysed and their welfare implications discussed. More generous bailouts, financed by the high‐income block, encourage borrowing and increase the probability of default. The optimal reserve requirements for both lender and borrower are characterised. The introduction of a reserve requirement in either country reduces the default risk and raises the welfare of both the high‐income and the emerging‐market economies.