Do Voting Rights Affect Institutional Investment Decisions? Evidence from Dual‐Class Firms
研究发现，双层股权公司的机构持股比例显著低于单层公司，且这种回避在受托责任强的长期投资者中更明显；统一股权后机构增持，表明投票权是机构投资决策的重要因素。
We examine whether, and to what extent, shareholder voting rights affect institutional investment decisions. We find that institutional ownership in dual‐class firms is significantly lower than it is in single‐class firms after controlling for other determinants of institutional investment. Although institutions of all types hold fewer shares of dual‐class firms, this avoidance is more pronounced for long‐term investors with strong fiduciary responsibilities than for short‐term investors with weak fiduciary duties. Following the unification of dual‐class shares into a single class, institutional investors increase their shareholdings in the unifying firm. Overall, our results suggest that voting rights are an important determinant of institutional investment decisions.