Should securities regulation promote equity crowdfunding?
挑战传统观点，指出过强的投资者保护可能损害小企业和创业项目，尤其在股权众筹领域；通过理论框架和德国证据，探讨最优监管取决于风险投资等替代融资的可获得性。
In this paper, we show that too strong investor protection may harm small firms and entrepreneurial initiatives, which contrasts with the traditional “law and finance” view that stronger investor protection is better. This situation is particularly relevant in equity crowdfunding, which refers to a recent financial innovation originating on the Internet that targets small and innovative firms. In many jurisdictions, securities regulation offers exemptions to prospectus and registration requirements. We provide an into-depth discussion of recent regulatory reforms in different countries and discuss how they may impact equity crowdfunding. Building on a theoretical framework, we show that optimal regulation depends on the availability of an alternative early-stage financing such as venture capital and angel finance. Finally, we offer exploratory evidence from Germany on the impact of securities regulation on small business finance.