Vertical Arrangements, Market Structure, and Competition: An Analysis of Restructured US Electricity Markets
研究电力市场中纵向整合或长期合同如何降低批发商抬高价格的动机，模拟三个重组市场后发现纵向安排显著影响市场结果，若禁止纵向安排（如加州）会导致价格飙升和生产效率损失超过45%。
This paper examines vertical arrangements in electricity markets. Vertically integrated wholesalers, or those with long-term contracts, have less incentive to raise wholesale prices when retail prices are determined beforehand. For three restructured markets, we simulate prices that define bounds on static oligopoly equilibria. Our findings suggest that vertical arrangements dramatically affect estimated market outcomes. Had regulators impeded vertical arrangements (as in California), our simulations imply vastly higher prices than observed and production inefficiencies costing over 45 percent of those production costs with vertical arrangements. We conclude that horizontal market structure accurately predicts market performance only when accounting for vertical structure.