Endogenous claims and collective production: an experimental study on the timing of profit-sharing negotiations and production
实验比较了事前与事后谈判两种时机对集体生产效率和分配的影响，发现事后谈判效率更高，而事前谈判几乎无效率，并用心理理论解释这一反直觉结果。
Abstract We explore the efficiency and distributive implications of a multilateral bargaining model with endogenous production of the surplus under two different timings: ex ante and ex post bargaining. Both timings are commonly observed in business partnerships and alliance formations. The theoretical predictions confirm an intuitive economic tenet: in ex post bargaining, effort is considered sunk and opportunistic bargaining behavior will dissuade players from producing. On the other hand, ex ante bargaining entails an allocation of ownership shares that induces at least certain members to invest in the common fund because their return is guaranteed. Experiments show opposite results: ex post bargaining yields almost fully efficient outcomes while the reverse timing entails near zero efficiency. The psychological theory of inequity is useful in reconciling these divergent results.