Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?
通过动态道德风险模型分析竞争对银行审慎行为的影响，发现资本要求虽能抑制冒险但导致帕累托低效，而附加存款利率控制可提升特许权价值实现帕累托最优。
In a dynamic model of moral hazard, competition can undermine prudent bank behavior. While capital-requirement regulation can induce prudent behavior, the policy yields Pareto-inefficient outcomes. Capital requirements reduce gambling incentives by putting bank equity at risk. However, they also have a perverse effect of harming banks' franchise values, thus encouraging gambling. Pareto-efficient outcomes can be achieved by adding deposit-rate controls as a regulatory instrument, since they facilitate prudent investment by increasing franchise values. Even if deposit-rate ceilings are not binding on the equilibrium path, they may be useful in deterring gambling off the equilibrium path.