Network Access Pricing and Deregulation
研究了放松管制后如何为在位企业的网络设施设定接入价格，强调接入价格需满足个体理性条件以实现自愿接入，并通过多种竞争模型分析其对有效进入的激励。
The paper addresses the question of pricing access to the network facilities of an incumbent firm after deregulation. Network access pricing continues to be regulated in such industries as telecommunications, railroads, eletric power and natural gas. We emphasize that access prices should be set such that they satisfy an individual rationality condition for the incumbent firm so that access is granted voluntarily. We examine the effects of the voluntary access condition incentives for entry and show that properly chosen access prices incentives for efficient entry using several alternative competition models: Bertrand–Nash, Cournot–Nash and competition Chamberlin with differentiated products.