INFORMATION ASYMMETRY, MANUFACTURER–RETAILER CONTRACTS, AND TWO‐SIDED ENTRY
研究了转移合同（制造商直接销售、零售商收取收入并返还转移支付）的经济决定因素，利用服装制造商进入百货商店的数据估计了双边不对称信息进入模型，发现逆向选择存在时转移合同对零售商更有利。
Abstract We investigate the economic determinants of contract structure and entry with transfer contracts, which specify that manufacturers directly sell their products in retail stores while retailers collect sales revenue and return a transfer to the manufacturers. Using a unique data set describing entry decisions of clothing manufacturers into a retail department store, we estimate a two‐sided, asymmetric‐information entry model. We compare profit estimates under transfer contracts to counterfactual profit estimates under common alternative contract formats. Results show that, when adverse selection is present, transfer contracts dominate other contract formats from the retailer's perspective; otherwise, the common alternative contract formats dominate.