I Promise to Pay
研究发现，消费者更可能遵守自己做出的还款承诺。当借款人因日程冲突无法亲自参加抵押贷款结算时，授权第三方代为承诺还款，这反而增加了贷款违约和止赎风险，但该效应在贷款发放与服务一体化的机构中消失。
Consumers are more likely to keep a repayment promise they make themselves. When a scheduling conflict prevents a borrower from attending a mortgage closing, a power of attorney (POA) empowers a third party to promise that the borrower will repay the loan. On a matched sample of POA and non-POA loans, and comparing within borrower and within property, I link POAs to greater delinquency and foreclosure. Although POAs are uncorrelated with cash flow shocks, they reflect reduced promise keeping when borrowers undergo financial distress. This association vanishes for originator-servicers’ loans, which suggests that financial intermediation plays a role in consumer lending.