Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives and Merger Decisions
研究了CEO内部杠杆率（代表风险承担激励）对并购类型（垂直、水平、多元化）选择及股东回报的影响，发现高内部杠杆率的CEO更倾向垂直并购，且此类并购的公告回报较低，尤其在信息不透明、治理弱和现金充裕的公司中更明显。
We provide evidence concerning the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions and outcomes for different types of mergers: vertical, horizontal, and diversifying. Using chief executive officer (CEO) relative inside leverage to proxy for the incentives of risk-averse managers, we find that CEOs with higher inside leverage are more likely to engage in vertical mergers, and those mergers generate lower announcement returns for shareholders. This effect of CEO relative inside leverage on returns for shareholders in vertical acquisitions is more pronounced when the acquirer has a higher degree of informational opacity, weak governance, and excess cash.