From the Invisible Handshake to the Invisible Hand? How Import Competition Changes the Employment Relationship
研究进口竞争是否削弱了雇主在雇佣时与工人达成的隐性工资协议，即工资不再受外部劳动力市场条件影响。利用汇率变动作为外生冲击，发现竞争加剧后，工人工资对当前失业率更敏感，对雇佣时失业率更不敏感，且雇主财务压力是驱动机制。
Does import competition alter the extent to which employers, after negotiating workers' wages upon hire, subsequently shield those wages from external labor-market conditions? If increased competition induces a switch away from these wage implicit agreements, then (1) the sensitivity of workers' wages to the current unemployment rate should increase as competition increases and (2) the sensitivity of workers' wages to the unemployment rate prevailing upon hire should decrease. Using exchange-rate movements to generate exogenous variation in import competition, I find evidence supporting both of these predictions. I show that increased financial pressures on employers is one mechanism driving these effects.