Risk, Incentives, and Contracts: Partnerships in Rio de Janeiro, 1870–1891
利用19世纪末里约热内卢的合伙合同个体数据，研究有限责任与无限责任合伙人之间的资本投入、利润分配及激励差异，并分析改革如何改变谈判权力从而影响合同条款。
We construct an individual-level data set of partnership contracts in late-nineteenth-century Rio de Janeiro to study the determinants of contract terms. Partners with limited liability contributed more capital and received lower draws for private expenses and lower profit shares than their unlimited partners. Unlimited partners in turn received higher-powered incentives when they contracted with limited partners than when they contracted with unlimited partners. A reform that changed the relative bargaining power further improved the terms of unlimited partners in limited firms. These findings highlight the roles of risk, incentives, and bargaining power in shaping contracts.