The Relation between Analysts' Forecasts of Long‐Term Earnings Growth and Stock Price Performance Following Equity Offerings*
发现卖方分析师在股权发行时对长期盈利增长的预测普遍过于乐观，尤其是主承销商的分析师，且预测越乐观的公司发行后表现越差，控制过度乐观后表现差异消失，支持了“股权发行之谜”源于发行时过度乐观的盈利增长预期。
Abstract In this paper we evaluate the role of sell‐side analysts' long‐term earnings growth forecasts in the pricing of common equity offerings. We find that, in general, sell‐side analysts' long‐term growth forecasts are systematically overly optimistic around equity offerings and that analysts employed by the lead managers of the offerings make the most optimistic growth forecasts. In additional, we find a positive relation between the fees paid to the affiliated analysts' employers and the level of the affiliated analysts' growth forecasts. We also document that the post‐offering underperformance is most pronounced for firms with the highest growth forecasts made by affiliated analysts. Finally, we demonstrate that the post‐offering underperformance disappears once we control for the overoptimism in earnings growth expectations. Thus, the evidence presented in this paper is consistent with the “equity issue puzzle” arising from overly optimistic earnings growth expectations held at the time of the offerings.