Proxy Advisory Firms: The Economics of Selling Information to Voters
分析了代理咨询公司向股东出售投票建议如何影响公司决策，发现信息质量低时股东过度依赖建议，信息精确时则可能因利润最大化而使用不足，只有信息足够精确才能提升投票信息含量。
ABSTRACT We analyze how proxy advisors, which sell voting recommendations to shareholders, affect corporate decision‐making. If the quality of the advisor's information is low, there is overreliance on its recommendations and insufficient private information production. In contrast, if the advisor's information is precise, it may be underused because the advisor rations its recommendations to maximize profits. Overall, the advisor's presence leads to more informative voting only if its information is sufficiently precise. We evaluate several proposals on regulating proxy advisors and show that some suggested policies, such as reducing proxy advisors' market power or decreasing litigation pressure, can have negative effects.